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THE CITIZENSHIP PARADOX IN A
TRANSNATIONAL AGE
Cristina M. Rodriguez*
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZEN-
SHIP IN THE UNITED STATES. By Hiroshi Motomura. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. vii, 254. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.
INTRODUCTION
Through Americans in Waiting, Hiroshi Motomura' tells us three differ-
ent stories about how U.S. law and policy, over time, have framed the
relationship between immigrants and the American body politic. He cap-
tures the complexity, historical contingency, and democratic urgency of that
relationship by canvassing the immigration law canon and teasing from it
the three frameworks that have structured immigrants' social status, their
interactions with the state, and the processes of immigrant integration and
naturalization. In so doing, he illuminates how popular mythologies about
the assimilative capacity of the American melting pot obscure myriad politi-
cal and social conflicts over how best to produce Americans. He also
demonstrates how alternating cycles of inclusive and exclusionary politics
have shaped the processes through which American citizenship has been
defined. As he charts this history, Motomura reminds us of the unceasing
importance of the institution of national citizenship, particularly in an era of
semiporous borders and transnational forms of political and economic asso-
ciation. He calls on Americans to honor the very best of the three historical
traditions he presents by treating lawful immigrants as American citizens in
waiting, presumptively entitled to all the prerogatives of membership.
In making this bold plea, Motomura brings to light a paradox that has
become increasingly apparent over the last decade. In a globalizing world
marked by heightened migration and transnational forms of association, we
still need robust conceptions of national, geographically anchored citizen-
ship to promote social cooperation. But the political institutions, such as
citizenship, that support strong frameworks of belonging cannot fully absorb
the influx of migrants with plural loyalties. The public opinion on which the
maintenance of those frameworks depends often resists including too many
new members, particularly when those new members are poor or racially
and culturally distinct. In other words, the global phenomena of large-scale
* Associate Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. Thank you to Kevin Davis and Nancy
Morawetz for their insights.
I. Kenan Distinguished Professor of Law, UNC School of Law.
2. See infra Section lI.B.
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migration and transnational loyalties fragment national political communi-
ties and make it more difficult for the institutions that traditionally promote
social cohesion-like citizenship-to effectively respond to that fragmenta-
tion.
This paradox may not be resolvable, and it may make full-scale revival
of the Americans-in-waiting ideal impossible. But the first step in address-
ing the dilemma is certainly to understand its origins. In Part I of this
Review, I therefore begin by discussing Motomura's account of the history
of immigration to the United States. Through this retelling, Motomura pro-
vides an essential resource for those steeped in immigration law and history,
as well as a revelatory read for anyone interested in how Americans can re-
main true to our historical willingness, as a nation of immigrants, to
incorporate newcomers humanely and fairly. In Part II, I consider why
Motomura's insights on the need for strong national anchors of belonging
still matter in a supposed transnational age and how that need conflicts with
the preferences of entrenched populations. This conflict results in what I call
the admissions-status tradeoff, or the dynamic whereby the acceptance of
large numbers of immigrants is accompanied by parsimonious treatment of
those same immigrants. I conclude by offering some thoughts on how to
broach these tensions in a way that is true to Motomura's vision of immi-
grants as Americans in waiting.
I. LOOKING IN ON IMMIGRATION: THREE OLD RELATIONSHIPS
In Americans in Waiting, Motomura identifies three conceptions of the
relationship between immigrants and the body politic that have shaped our
law and policy: immigration as contract, immigration as affiliation, and im-
migration as transition (pp. 8-12). The discussion of immigration as
transition represents the normative and emotional heart of the book, as well
as Motomura's primary challenge to his readers. In dialogue with the work
of other scholars who have made the case for treating immigrants as full and
genuine members of our society,3 Motomura calls for a reinvigoration of the
idea that immigrants are in transition toward becoming American citizens
and therefore should be treated as presumptively equal to citizens (p. 9).
Motomura describes immigration as transition as a lost tradition in our
immigration history that predates the passage of the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (p. 8). According to this tradition, lawful residents who filed
a declaration expressing their intention to naturalize acquired many of the
rights of citizenship. "Intending citizens" possessed voting rights into the
3. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10 (1990) ("[1ff membership is to be the guiding principle for constitutional
analysis of the immigration power, then the circle of membership should include permanently resid-
ing aliens."); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1093-1100 (1976) (noting that many states permitted aliens to vote through
much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century). For an excellent discussion of the complex
interaction of immigration and alienage law and the ways in which the border reaches inside the
United States to justify drawing distinctions between citizens and noncitizens, see LINDA BOSNIAK,
THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006).
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early twentieth century, as well as the right to sponsor the immigration of
their relatives without limitation. They were eligible for grants of land under
the 1862 Homestead Act, and many states and localities permitted them to
participate in public-works projects and other public programs intended for
citizens (pp. 116-19).
Not all immigrants were eligible to be treated as Americans in waiting,
of course. As Motomura points out, naturalization was open only to whites
from 1790 to 1870, to whites and blacks from 1870 to the 1940s, and to all
immigrants regardless of race only after 1952 (p. 123). But the equal treat-
ment of intending citizens reflected a belief that certain "we/they"
dichotomies are inappropriate in a democratic society (p. 14). Motomura
calls for a universally applicable revival of this conception to honor our
country's immigrant traditions and advance the integration of current immi-
grants, who are arriving in the United States in unprecedented numbers.4
To understand what such presumptive equality would entail and to ap-
preciate why Motomura's Americans-in-waiting idea is simultaneously
compelling and challenging, it is first critical to understand the frameworks
with which immigration as transition has competed throughout American
history. Under immigration as contract, immigrants are entitled to remain in
the United States as long as they abide by the terms of their admission
(p. 36). The government need only provide them with fair notice of those
terms. Should the terms be violated, the government can revoke its permis-
sion to stay at any time and deport the immigrant-an option not available
to the government in its relations with its citizens. The animating principles
behind immigration as contract are fairness and the protection of expecta-
tions, not equal treatment (p. 10). Equality presumes belonging. But under
the immigration-as-contract framework, noncitizens, by definition, do not
belong to the body politic, and equal treatment therefore has no place in
defining their status (pp. 88-89).
Immigration as affiliation, by contrast, assumes that immigrants can earn
their inclusion in the body politic (p. 89). The ties and roots immigrants es-
tablish inside the United States-to employers, to spouses and children who
are citizens, and to social networks-gradually transform immigrants from
outsiders to quasi citizens. As immigrants become increasingly integrated
into American life, they accrue entitlements that the government must rec-
ognize--entitlements that also, indirectly, protect the interests of the U.S.
citizens to whom they have become attached (p. 90). In other words, immi-
grants derive their status from the role they play in making our society
function. The terms of their membership can change over time as that role
4. See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 8-9 (2003); Mary C. Waters & Tomdis R. Jim&
nez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges, 31 ANN. REV.
Soc. 105, 107 (2005) ("[W]e believe that there will be a ... replenishment of immigrants that is
likely to be a defining characteristic of American immigration for years to come."); cf Mary C.
Waters and Reed Ueda, Introduction, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE
1965 1, 2 (Mary C. Waters et al. eds., 2007) ("The foreign-born of the 21st century are more numer-
ous than ever before, but at 12.1 percent of the population, they constitute a smaller proportion of
the total population than they did a century ago, when they were 14.7 percent.").
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evolves, in contrast to the contract model that determines an immigrant's
rights upon his arrival (p. 90). Though the transition and affiliation models
can both be characterized as inclusive, under the latter in particular, "Amer-
ica's welcome is uncertain and deferred," and immigrants are not treated as
presumptively equal (pp. 154-55).
Both immigration as contract and immigration as affiliation have shaped
our laws and policies, and together largely have subsumed the transition
model. Motomura canvasses the Supreme Court's major immigration cases
and shows how these models have competed with one another in court opin-
ions and legislative debates. Immigration as contract, for example, emerged
in the foundational cases of immigration law through which the Supreme
Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Acts and developed the so-called ple-
nary power doctrine! Though the ideology of Anglo-Saxon superiority
expressed by the Court marks the opinions as products of the late nineteenth
century, the idea that controlling borders, or setting the terms of immigrant
admissions, is a core function of the national sovereign remains vital today.
Immigration as contract therefore shapes much of contemporary immigra-
tion law. For instance, Congress has dramatically expanded the grounds for
removal under the aggravated felony category-a category that originally
included murder and the trafficking of firearms or drugs but that has been
broadened to include fraud or deceit crimes and crimes classified as misde-
meanors under state law (p. 55). This expansion of the list of terms
according to which immigrants forfeit their right to remain in the United
States reflects a continuation of the contract mentality.6 Proposals circulated
in the last year for guest worker programs' that would admit workers on a
strictly temporary basis with no path to permanent residence and bar those
workers who violate the terms of their visa from ever legally returning to the
United States also reflect the contract mentality.
8
As Motomura points out, because the contract framework consists of the
fairness principles of notice and the protection of expectations, it can some-
5. See, e.g., United States v. Chae Chan Ping (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889). This doctrine is the constitutional justification for Congress's complete authority to set the
terms of immigrant admissions and provide for removal of noncitizens who fail to comply with
those terms. P 29. Though the doctrine originated in a contract framework, it permits Congress to
adjust the model according to the prevailing sentiment of the day.
6. At the same time that the grounds for removal have expanded, relief from removal-an
expression of the affiliation model-has become more difficult to win. P. 55.
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Talking Nonsense: The Bush administration's plan on immigration is
divorced from reality, WASH. POST, April 2, 2007, at A14 (discussing President Bush's latest pro-
posal to limit guest worker visas to six years total and require visa holders to leave the country every
two years for six months at a time); see also Side-by-Side Chart for Major Immigration Legislation
Pending in 109th Congress, Migration Policy Inst., available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
ITFIAF/legislation-janO6.pdf (listing the visa terms for various bills).
8. I have critiqued reliance on the contract model in existing proposals for a large-scale
guest worker program elsewhere. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: To-
ward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219
(noting that because migrants' intents change, temporary guest worker programs force migrants into
an untenable choice and impose externalities by creating a temporary laboring class without full
participation rights).
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times work in the immigrant's favor, as when the Supreme Court declined,
in INS v. St. Cyr,9 to apply new eligibility rules for cancellation of removal
to a noncitizen whose conviction had been entered before the new rules
were put into place (pp. 56-57). But the Court also made clear that it would
not strike down a clear statement from Congress that it intended the rules to
be applied retroactively, suggesting that Congress retains the power to
change the terms of the contract between the noncitizen and the state. In-
deed, the constantly expanding definition of aggravated felony applies
retroactively to render removable noncitizens who were convicted of crimes
that were not considered aggravated felonies at the time they were commit-
ted, arguably defying the notice the immigrant had been given and thus
thwarting the immigrant's original expectations.
According to Motomura, immigration as affiliation emerged in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century "to compete with immigration as contract,"
in response to the imperatives of the developing welfare state (p. 80). As
welfarism evolved, policymakers came to understand government obliga-
tions as arising out of "more elusive notions of justice" that did not depend
on voluntary consent or express agreements (p. 88). Under the affiliation
framework, the longer an immigrant has lived in the United States and the
more significant his ties have become, the more likely he is to be recognized
by a court or by the state as a member entitled to protection of his interests.
This conception of immigration animates the law's provision for relief
from removal, providing a kind of equitable remedy by which a noncitizen
otherwise deemed removable might remain in the United States. This relief
from removal often turns on the strength of the immigrant's ties to the
United States (pp. 97-100). Immigration as affiliation also framed legisla-
tive debates in 1996 over whether to deny lawful immigrants welfare
benefits (p. 85). In the original legislation, eligibility for benefits depended
in part on immigrants' ties to the United States. The framework subse-
quently enabled courts that heard challenges to the final legislation to
uphold distinctions Congress had drawn between types of noncitizens on the
ground that Congress could have employed the distinctions to "reward ...
service or to encourage other aliens to make similar contributions in the fu-
ture."'0 Immigration as affiliation continues to influence immigration-policy
debates today. It helps explain proposals to legalize large portions of the
twelve million unauthorized immigrants in the United States on the ground
that they have become structurally embedded within the U.S. economy and
the lives of U.S. citizens in communities across the country. Calls to add a
path to permanent residency to guest worker proposals similarly reflect im-
migration as affiliation because they reward temporary workers who remain
in the United States long enough to develop meaningful ties, along with the
desire to remain.
Given the immigration-fueled demographic changes occurring in the
United States today, Motomura's extended reflection on immigration and
9. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
10. P. 87 (quoting City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 609 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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citizenship in American history could not be timelier or more necessary.
Through deft presentation of historical narratives and individual case stud-
ies, Motomura demonstrates how each conception of immigration has
played a role in the development of our immigration laws, and he highlights
the best and worst of each approach. In calling for a revival of the Ameri-
cans-in-waiting ideal, Motomura challenges readers to be true to some of
our most honorable historical practices at a time when public debate is beset
by ideological divisions and intergroup competition.
II. LOOKING OUT ON MIGRATION: NEW FORMS OF ASSOCIATION
Motomura's efforts to promote the formation of bidirectional loyalties
between immigrants and American society assume that naturalization is or
should be the end goal of immigration. But a profusion of social science
literature focused on the movement of people around the world is increas-
ingly demonstrating that migrants have varied intentions and that much
migration is best understood as cyclical or temporary. Whereas Motomura
writes about immigrants, or persons who leave one society to work and be-
come part of another, the social science literature refers to migrants, or
persons who move, without reference to a final destination." Seen in this
light, the concept of Americans in waiting shows its pre-1952 pedigree and
represents an old tradition out of step with the dynamics of global migra-
tion. We may well need new forms of association to structure the
relationship between today's migrants and our body politic, but the idea of
Americans in waiting offers a square peg for a round hole.
Despite originating in a different time and place, however, a framework
for belonging that does not depend on having formal citizenship status but
that nonetheless possesses many of the attributes of strong national citizen-
ship remains viable-indeed, it is an essential concept. Motomura reminds
us of our continued need for a simultaneously robust and inclusive concep-
tion of citizenship. In a globalized world, we still need expansive
conceptions of national citizenship to promote social cooperation and create
incentives for civic engagement, even among migrants whose intent is not to
resettle permanently.
But recognizing the continuing need for strong national-citizenship
frameworks in our contemporary context exposes the potentially irresolv-
able paradox posed by Americans in Waiting: a dilemma I call the
admissions-status dynamic. International migration produces fragmentation,
which creates a need for strong institutional anchors that promote unity
within a society in the face of immigrants' external loyalties. But the institu-
tions that serve as those anchors, such as national citizenship, are not always
able to absorb the consequences of globalization, particularly when they
11. Motomura himself recognizes that the trend in U.S. law is decidedly away from the
citizens-in-waiting conception, noting that immigration to the United States has become increas-
ingly temporary (or channeled through temporary visas) and unlawful; only thirty-eight percent of
noncitizens who came to the United States in 2004 came as lawful permanent residents, down from
sixty-six percent in the period between 1998 and 1999. P. 141.
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come in the form of immigrants. The profusion of unauthorized immigra-
tion 2 and the trend toward temporary legal immigration statuses underscore
this problem because they reflect our lack of will or ability to extend full
membership to the many people with whom we have become interdepend-
ent. The growing need for immigrants at both the high end and low end of
the labor market has corresponded with increasingly circumscribed immi-
gration statuses (including unlawful status), which in turn is undermining
the promotion of integration-an essential component of maintaining social
cohesion in an increasingly diverse environment. To understand whether it is
possible to resolve this puzzle, it is first critical to assess each of its pieces.
A. Transnationalism and Fluidity
At first glance, Motomura's focus on permanent immigration may seem
out of step with migration patterns in an age of transnationalism. By invok-
ing transnationalism, I mean to refer to two different but interrelated
dynamics: the process by which migration creates networks and ties across
borders, 3 and the cyclical as opposed to straight-line nature of migration.
On the first score, as one scholar defines it, "transnationalism refers to some
combination of plural civic and political memberships, economic involve-
ments, social networks, and cultural identities that reach across and link
people and institutions in two or more nation-states in diverse, multilayered
patterns."'' 4 Scholars who study these patterns stress that migrants create
"new transnational spaces" that "de-territorialize ... the nation-states they
link."' 5 Within this literature, some scholars suggest that social life is no
longer organized primarily around the nation state. 6 This emerging transna-
tional trope is organized around the idea that we have entered a postnational
era in which immigrants travel back and forth between two different socie-
ties, carrying with them multiple national (and local) allegiances. 7 This sort
12. For data comprehensively describing the unauthorized population, see JEFFREY S. PAS-
SEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S. (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6l.pdf.
13. See Peggy Levitt & Mary C. Waters, Introduction, in THE CHANGING FACE OF HOME:
THE TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF THE SECOND GENERATION 1, 5 (Peggy Levitt & Mary C. Waters
eds., 2002).
14. Ewa Morawska, Transnationalism, in THE NEW AMERICANS, supra note 4, at 149, 149.
15. Id. at 149-50; see also SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS 133 (1999) ("National
governments still have sovereignty over many matters, but they are increasingly part of a web of
rights and regulations that are embedded in other entities-from EC institutions to courts defending
the human rights of refugees.").
16. See, e.g., Levitt & Waters, supra note 13, at 8 (citing YASEMIN NUHO6LU SOYSAL, LIM-
ITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994)).
17. See Alejandro Portes et al., The Study of Transnationalism, 22 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.
217 (1999) (discussing surveys documenting the small but significant number of migrants "living
across borders").
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of movement exposes the limitations and constraints of national citizenship
and gives rise to new frameworks of belonging. 8
To be sure, the difference between today's transnationalism and the mi-
gration of previous periods of American history may be one of degree rather
than kind.' 9 But, as scholars of transnationalism emphasize, whereas immi-
grants in earlier phases of migration were "closet transnationalists, 20 today
the phenomenon is "out into the open,' 2' studied and understood by scholars
and policymakers. Ease of travel and communication also has made transna-
tionalism more persistent across generations. Some scholars contend, in
response to these changes, that we should reformulate our conception of
citizenship to make it more plural, creative, and fluid than the sort of transi-
tional model Motomura champions. We should think in terms of
immigrants' "options" for participation2 2 across borders instead of aggres-
sively constructing American citizens.
The second important transnational dynamic that puts pressure on the
Americans-in-waiting idea is the reality that much migration is cyclical.
Some migration will result in permanent resettlement, but a great deal of
migration is motivated not by a desire to start a new life in a new country
but by the desire to support a family or finance home construction or busi-
ness development in one's country of origin.23 This pattern appears to be
particularly true for Mexican migrants and therefore should be particularly
relevant to American discourse on citizenship and belonging. As Doug
Massey and Jorge Durand have put it, "[left to their own devices, most
Mexican immigrants would work in the United States only sporadically and
18. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS 277-78 (discussing "Today's
Changed Relation to the National State" and analyzing how the "transformations in the condition of
the national . . . show [citizenship's] national spatial character as but one of several possible fram-
ings"). For a discussion of types of transnational practices, see Levitt & Waters, supra note 13, at 9
(noting that nearly ten percent of Colombians, Dominicans, and Salvadorans "were involved in
some form of regular transnational political engagement"-including membership in a home-
country political party, civic hometown associations, and home-country electoral-campaign partici-
pation-and nearly twenty percent "reported occasional participation").
19. See NANCY FONER, IN A NEW LAND 63 (2005) ("[B]y now, there is general agreement
that transnationalism is not a new phenomenon .... At the same time, much is distinctive about
transnationalism today not only because earlier patterns have been intensified but also because new
processes and dynamics are involved."); Nancy Foner, Second-Generation Transnationalism, Then
and Now, in THE CHANGING FACE OF HOME, supra note 13, at 242, 245; see also Morawska, supra
note 14, at 150.
20. Ewa Morawska, Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This
Great Wave and the Last, in E PLURIBUS UNUM? CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 175, 193 (Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001).
21. FONER, supra note 19, at 77.
22. See id. at 239 n.86.
23. E.g., Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey, What We Learned from The Mexican Migra-
tion Project, in CROSSING THE BORDER: RESEARCH FROM THE MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT 1, 6-7
(Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey eds., 2004); see also Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness:
America's Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129, 135 (Carol M.
Swain ed., 2007) (demonstrating how increased border enforcement has had the effect of thwarting
what would otherwise be cyclical or return migration by Mexican migrants).
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for limited periods. '24 Over time, some of these migrants surely will develop
the desire to resettle. But if large numbers of migrants do not seek belong-
ing, does it make sense to design a legal and social framework for
accommodating migration that aggressively facilitates belonging? My claim
is that it does, and I turn now to explaining why immigration as transition
remains a relevant-even essential-paradigm.
B. Nation-statism and Stability
Even in the face of a transnational zeitgeist, it is crucial that we maintain
frameworks for immigrant belonging that approximate the status of national
citizenship, not only for the sake of migrants themselves, but also for the
sake of our own civil society. As Linda Bosniak puts it, "'[p]ostnational' or
'transnational' forms of citizenship remain a real but limited part of the citi-
zenship landscape. 25 Many migrants will either intend to resettle from the
outset or develop the intent to resettle over time. For this reason, it is essen-
tial that scholars attend to the complex practices and institutions that we call
citizenship within the national society. Given these dynamics, encouraging
immigrants' deep social and political integration from the early stages of
their presence is in everyone's long-term interests.
The Americans-in-waiting approach structures the relationship between
new arrivals and the society into which they have entered in the way most
likely to produce successful coexistence between immigrants and existing
citizens. First and foremost, immigration as transition provides the strongest
incentives for immigrants themselves to integrate. As Motomura explains,
the way people are invited into the country influences their joining behavior
(p. 188). Giving immigrants the option of becoming Americans in waiting
creates an incentive to invest in society, as well as the institutionally sup-
ported freedom to make the most of their precitizenship transition period.
Recent evidence suggests that migrants respond to such incentives, at least
when they take the form of threats. When political trends undermine the
security that lawful permanent resident status provides, rates of naturaliza-
tion rise.26 Incentives that come in the form of promises rather than threats
might work as well, and Motomura is right to suggest that immigrants and
24. Durand & Massey, supra note 23, at 6.
25. BOSNIAK, supra note 3, at 6.
26. The number of naturalized citizens has grown steadily in this decade, increasing from
463,204 in 2003 to 702,589 in 2006. Julia Preston, Sharp Rise Seen in Applications for Citizenship,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2007, at AI. This growth may be attributable to a number of factors, including
the 1996 welfare reforms that barred many legal immigrants from federal benefits; a corresponding
climate of hostility toward immigration that compounds noncitizens' status as outside the political
community; and vigorous naturalization drives promoted by states with high immigrant populations,
such as Illinois, Spanish-language media, and other constituencies interested in integrating and
enfranchising immigrants. For a discussion of Illinois' new citizens initiatives, see Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MicH. L. REV. 567 (2008).
Though these factors would not be reflected in the statistics cited above, an imminent increase in the
naturalization fee and worry that the government is in the process of making the civics and language
tests more difficult are also spurring naturalization. See Preston, supra.
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Americans alike stand to gain from opening up spaces for quicker integra-
tion and loyalty formation. For those who intend to resettle in the United
States, incentives toward naturalization encourage economic, social, and
cultural investment from early on in the immigrant experience."
By creating these incentives, laws and policies that embody immigration
as transition also help the host society cope with the impacts of immigra-
tion. One of the primary challenges presented by large-scale immigration is
the possibility of cultural change. Anxiety over this change contributes to
the perception by members of the host society that immigrants are reluctant
to assimilate into their new surroundings. But an immigration framework
that includes self-conscious declarations by immigrants of their intent to
become citizens and gives immigrants incentives to integrate could help
dampen these anxieties. Of course, the idea of immigration as transition was
forged in an era when the concept of assimilation had strong overtones of
Anglo-Saxon superiority, and it would be unacceptable today to structure
assimilation frameworks with this old hierarchy in mind. But policies re-
flecting immigration as transition need not include the expectation that
immigrants abandon their cultures" or even citizenships of origin, as the
expansion of dual citizenship around the world and the greater tolerance for
diversity in the United States suggest. In the end, the integration incentives
offered by the Americans-in-waiting idea, coupled with these new forms of
tolerance, may well be our best bet for balancing the competing social and
cultural interests of immigrants and host society members.
These insights about loyalty formation and integration are also relevant
to understanding the citizenship implications of cyclical migration, even
though immigration as transition as a model assumes permanent resettle-
ment. Even a temporary intent does not obviate the need for strong
29institutional anchors for belonging. Migrants who set out with the intent to
stay only temporarily can and do remain for prolonged periods of time in
the society they initially joined for short-term reasons. 3° Whether the ex-
tended stay is the result of not wanting to give up economic gains they have
made or of new attachments to spouses and children who are citizens, his-
tory shows that the rise of temporary migration does not mean the end of
long-term immigrant presence, even among those with self-consciously
temporary intent.
Relatedly, the social security of the second generation is also at stake,
and our conceptions of immigration must take those interests into account.
Migrants, whether they intend to return to their countries of origin or not,
27. I have discussed this idea of investment elsewhere. See Rodriguez, supra note 8; see also
Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV.
809, 827-29 (2007) (noting that policies, such as guest worker programs, that treat immigrants as if
they were on probation delay their investment in society).
28. FONER, supra note 19, at 77 ("Now, when there is an official commitment to cultural
pluralism and cultural diversity, transnational ties are more visible and acceptable-and sometimes
even celebrated in public settings.... Indeed, transnationalism is good for American businesses.").
29. See Rodriguez, supra note 8.
30. Id.
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often produce either citizen children or children who can imagine no other
home than the United States. A child's integration and social success depend
in part on the framework for belonging available to the child's parents. The
effects of the transnational lifestyle on the second generation are only now
being studied,3 but it is safe to say that having parents whose presence in
the United States is based on immigration as contract can be destabilizing;
removal orders, for example, have civil society implications because they
destabilize the lives of families and communities left behind. The point is
not that immigrants who commit deportable acts should not be removed but
that defining the terms of an immigrant's right to be in the United States has
second-generation and therefore civil society implications that should be
taken into account 32-a factor that supports invigoration of immigration as
transition. 3 The right to remain that citizenship provides is crucial for the
migrant and those with whom he associates, even when migration is cyclical
or allegiances are multiple.
Finally, there are serious civil society implications to permitting tempo-
rary migrants to remain disconnected from the world in which they
physically reside. The presence of a temporary laboring class without deep
interests in becoming part of the communities around them may well dimin-
ish support and regard for immigrants generally and exacerbate the distrust
that Robert Putnam's research has shown arises in ethnically diverse set-
tings.' This distrust is certainly evident in efforts by local communities to
use zoning ordinances to prevent large groups of immigrant men from living
in single-family homes-a quality-of-life move designed to prevent com-
munities from becoming worksites and way stations. The point here is not to
cast blame on temporary migrants.35 Instead, the point is to underscore the
relevance of loyalty formation and integration, even in the context of tempo-
31. For a compilation of essays discussing these effects, see THE CHANGING FACE OF HOME,
supra note 13.
32. As Motomura points out, and as I note above, these effects are taken into account in
certain relief-from-removal provisions, but it is also important that they be considered in managing
the front-end of migration: the terms of admission and the ex ante definition of grounds for removal.
33. This factor also supports a strengthening of immigration as affiliation. The advantage of
the transition framework, however, is that it does not require the migrant to prove the strength of his
or her affiliation and therefore does not give an immigration judge or other decision maker the
power to determine whether an affiliation is sufficiently strong in an individual case. Immigration as
transition provides a form of across-the-board, ex ante protection that immigration as affiliation does
not.
34. In his latest research, Robert Putnam documents the diminished trust and absence of
feelings of solidarity that characterize ethnically diverse settings. He argues that though increased
immigration and diversity are "inevitable" and "over the long run ... desirable," in the short term
they "challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital." Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum:
Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138
(2007).
35. Indeed, temporary migration may be to the long-term benefit of the hemisphere as a
whole given its connection to development in Mexico. See MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, INTER-
AMERICAN DEV. BANK, SENDING MONEY HOME: LEVERAGING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF RE-
MITTANCES 1 (2006), available at http://www.iadb.org/news/docs/remittances-EN.pdf.
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rary migration, and to demonstrate that efforts to channel this migration le-
gally should be designed to facilitate investment.
36
In a world in which borders have diminishing power to stop migration, it
is all the more important to ground social and political identities in a con-
ception of belonging that carries with it not only privileges but also
obligations. As Motomura's work suggests, conceptions of belonging must
have content that grounds migrants in the geographic space in which they
actually, physically live-even if they intend only to live there for a short
period of time. This grounding secures social stability by requiring people to
invest in the community around them.
Countries like Mexico are playing an important part in promoting this
stability by permitting dual citizenship. But the stakes are different in a re-
ceiving country like the United States, and therein rests the problem. Dual
citizenship is clearly in Mexico's national self-interest in light of the number
of its citizens who leave, many for good. For the United States, however,
accepting dual citizenship and other forms of dual belonging primarily
means integrating large numbers of newcomers, rather than simply permit-
ting citizens who have established lives elsewhere to retain their legal ties to
the United States. In other words, the United States faces unique challenges
when it comes to development of cross-border forms of belonging. As pref-
erable as the Americans-in-waiting construct may be for integrating new
immigrants, it may require too much of the United States, politically and
socially, under current conditions. I turn now to considering this possibility.
C. Impossible Trade-offs
Though the Americans-in-waiting ideal may be theoretically compatible
with-and crucial to-the effective management of contemporary forms of
migration, it is not clear that the model is achievable given the admissions-
status dynamic. According to the dynamic, more immigration translates into
diminished support for immigrants' rights, and more robust immigrants'
rights translate into less support for immigrant admission.37 To put it crudely,
if cheap labor is suddenly transformed into expensive citizens in waiting, the
doors to immigrants may well close altogether. If we commit to treating
immigrants as citizens, we may well erode what support exists for large-
scale immigration, giving rise to policies that more strictly limit the number
of people permitted to enter. Such restrictions would be justified on the
ground that we must be highly selective about those we admit given that
36. See Rodriguez, supra note 8 (arguing that even temporary migrants maintain a presence
for significant periods of time and that offering the possibility of permanent membership would
facilitate the development of ties and be preferable to creation of an isolated laboring class).
37. Some scholars have made this point conceptually. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at
20 (noting that the "generosity" embodied in the extension of federal benefits to legal permanent
residents "may be based in large part on Congress's ability to limit entry and therefore limit the
costs of benevolence"). Evidence from citizenship developments in Europe similarly underscores
this dynamic. Marc Morj6 Howard, Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Re-
search, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 443, 451 (2006) (noting that elite reform has led to liberalization of
citizenship laws but that when public opinion "gets activated," liberalization is usually thwarted).
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they will be presumptively entitled to join our political community. In short,
a society may be willing to absorb large-scale immigration only if it can
maintain tight control over the benefits that accrue to immigrants, reserving
for citizens alone the most expensive or most valued goods of citizenship.
Trends in immigration law and policy in the United States reflect this
trade-off. In the midst of record rates of immigration, our framework for
accommodating migration has become increasingly contractual in nature."
The admissions-status dynamic, which Motomura does not confront di-
rectly in his book,39 was apparent during the 1996 immigration reforms,
which excluded lawful immigrants from many public-benefits programs but
did not restrict immigrant admissions. The reforms also made it easier to
remove noncitizens by expanding the definition of aggravated felony to in-
clude even quite minor offenses, suggesting an increasingly parsimonious
contract mentality and a heightened desire to expand control over the immi-
grant population in exchange for permitting immigration levels to remain at
already high levels. During the immigration debates of 2006 and 2007, guest
worker programs came back into vogue. The "Grand Bargain" that emerged
from the Senate in May 2007 would have adopted a temporary worker pro-
gram without a path to citizenship in order to fill the needs of our labor
market. The legalization plan crafted by President Bush and a bipartisan
coalition in the Senate reflected elements of the affiliation model through its
recognition of the integration of the unauthorized population into American
society. But even so, it would not have extended the possibility of citizen-
ship status to immigrants for approximately thirteen years.40 The
compromise would have accepted the presence of the high numbers of im-
migrants needed to fill our labor market needs, but it would have done so
without a generous extension of the indicia of belonging, including the pre-
sumptive right to remain.
Perhaps most telling is the brute fact of unauthorized immigration. The
twelve million unauthorized immigrants inside the United States arguably
demonstrate that immigration as transition has limited viability under cur-
rent conditions. For at least the last decade, lawmakers, law enforcement,
and U.S. citizens themselves have tolerated an arrangement that is economi-
cally beneficial both to immigrants and to the United States, but we have
made no real effort as a nation to treat the immigrants on whom we clearly
38. It also has become more temporary, as I point out elsewhere. Rodriguez, supra note 8
(noting that more of our labor needs are filled today using temporary visas). In 2004, only thirty-
eight percent of lawful permanent residents in the United States arrived initially on permanent visas,
a figure down from sixty-six percent between 1998 and 1999. Id. at 33-34. Motomura himself cites
this statistic. P. 141.
39. Motomura does observe, in addressing the historical demise of the transition model, that
"[a]s immigration became more open to all, being an immigrant meant less," p. 136, but he does not
confront the implications of this trade-off for his theory of how immigration law should be reori-
ented.
40. See Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., S. 1639-Why the Current Senate Bill Would Preclude
Real Reform (June 25, 2007), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/cirO27.htm (last visited Nov.
3, 2007).
1123April 200811
Michigan Law Review
41depend as potential American citizens : we have regarded them instead as
expendable. We accept the immigrants we need, look away (while simulta-
neously beefing up border enforcement) when those immigrants are
unauthorized, and make no commitment to their long-term interests.42
Americans in Waiting does not reckon with these implications of the unau-
thorized phenomenon-a significant omission, as the size and persistence of
the unauthorized population suggests that immigration as transition is not
feasible as a political platform.
Forms of status equal to or resembling citizenship are, in fact, notori-
ously difficult for immigrants to win in the political process, not least
because immigrants are not formal participants. Existing political communi-
ties also tend to be reluctant to change their composition by accepting too
many outsiders. When the public believes immigrants are causing a fiscal
drain, it agitates for scaling back the attributes of full belonging. 3
A variety of explanations can be ventured for this dynamic, including
the proposition that it is legitimate to favor members of one's family over
strangers, particularly when resources seem tight." It is a defensible and
widely held belief that we owe a duty first and foremost to our compatriots,
or our preexisting fellow citizens. Treating immigrants presumptively as
citizens, particularly during a time of large-scale migration, can be seen as
compromising redistributive objectives or commitments already entered into
by the preexisting members of the nation state.
Events in Europe illustrate an extreme version of this dynamic. Europe's
robust welfare state depends on a kind of thick social contract-a commit-
ment to a national community formed through a sense of belonging to one
41. For a brief discussion of this dependence, see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
42. The collapse of immigration reform in June 2007 underscores this dynamic. There are, to
be sure, many Americans and lawmakers who object to illegal immigration, but few if any voices
called for mass deportations-a spectacle that could neither be accomplished nor stomached. In-
stead, a lot of sturm und drang concerning the demise of the rule of law marked the reform debate,
but, in the end, the only comprehensive solution on the table that combined tough enforcement with
legalization was defeated. This left in place a status quo of high levels of unauthorized immigration,
sporadic and destabilizing raids, and no means of bringing the millions of unauthorized immigrants
inside the United States out of the proverbial shadows.
43. Americans consistently do not support the expansion of immigration even when they
support legalization. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect between Public Attitudes and Policy
Outcomes in Immigration, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION, supra note 23, at 17, 20 ("81 percent of
Americans oppose higher immigration-a level of opposition that contradicts the thrust of immigra-
tion's political economy, which is decidedly expansionist .. " (footnote omitted)).
44. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM 158 (2006) ("[A]s Adam Smith saw,
to say that we have obligations to strangers isn't to demand that they have the same grip on our
sympathies as our nearest and dearest. We'd better start with the recognition that they don't."). We
can cabin the question of whether a community of citizens, or a nation state, is appropriately analo-
gized to a family and nonetheless appreciate that a familial dynamic is at work in the processes of
national self-definition.
45. For an articulation of the justifications for this widely accepted assumption, see Stephen
Macedo, The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION, supra note
23, at 63, 64 ("Citizens have special obligations to one another: we have special reasons to be con-
cemed with the distribution of wealth and opportunities among citizens.... I argue that it is as
members or co-participants in self-governing political communities that we have special obligations
to our fellow members.").
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and the same people. A commitment to a common project of social support
depends on participants sharing strong affinities, which are largely absent in
the relationship between an entrenched society and newcomers. As Robert
Putnam explains, though societies in the long run develop mechanisms for
creating "new forms of social solidarity" to "dampen the negative effects of
diversity" and create "new, more encompassing identities," the social soli-
darity on which welfare-state policies depend is clearly challenged by the
46
arrival of new, ethnically diverse immigrants in the short term. This chal-
lenge, combined with Europe's lack of experience with large-scale
immigration until relatively recently, has given rise to an admissions-status
tradeoff that has resulted in social unrest and emboldened nationalist, anti-
immigrant political parties and movements.47
The United States has had more experience with large-scale immigra-
tion, but, for the most part, it has traded status away in favor of admission,
both legal and illegal. Philosophers such as Michael Walzer would have us
make different choices. Walzer argues that a democratic society cannot jus-
tify treating immigrants differently from citizens: "[M]embers must be
prepared to accept, as their own equals in a world of shared obligations, the
men and women they admit ... . In return, "immigrants must be prepared
to share the obligations. 4 9 The relationship between citizens and nonciti-
zens, or noncitizens and the state, is one of "perfect reciprocity" under this
point of view'°-a perspective that shares some basic assumptions with
Motomura's conception of immigration as transition. But the consequence
of this view is an admissions-status tradeoff different from the one we have
been making: a society must be very careful about whom it admits if it is
going to treat them as citizens. The demand that immigrants be treated as
citizens justifies keeping the border relatively closed and tightly controlled.
Indeed, Walzer, along with most liberal political theorists, assumes the de-
mocratic legitimacy of border closure."
46. Putnam, supra note 34, at 138-39.
47. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 37, at 450 (discussing right-wing parties). For discussions
of immigration-related social tensions in Europe see, for example, David Bell, The Shorn Identity,
NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 5, 2005, at 20 (noting in the wake of the Paris riots that while France has a
long and successful multiethnic history, the model of French republican citizenship no longer works
well as a model for integrating immigrants); Oliver Burkeman, Going to Pot, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
21, 2005, at 10 (discussing the erosion of the Dutch concept of "gedogen," or "live and let live");
Christopher Caldwell, Islam on the Outskirts of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 5, 2006, at
54 (discussing Muslim immigrants in Sweden); and Peter Schneider, The New Berlin Wall, N.Y.
TIMES MAO., Dec. 4, 2005, at 66 (discussing the rise of increasingly insulated Turkish neighbor-
hoods in Berlin).
48. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 52 (1983).
49. Id.
50. Rodrfguez, supra note 8.
51. For an excellent discussion of this literature, see BOSNIAK, supra note 3, at 125-29 (de-
scribing the liberal approach to these questions as soft on the inside and hard on the outside and
noting that liberal theorists generally "criticize[] internal subordination of noncitizens" but "presup-
pose, and sometimes affirm, the action of exclusionary borders").
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The difficulty with this vision of perfect internal reciprocity is under-
scored by today's crisis of unauthorized immigration: borders cannot be
fully closed, at least not given current conditions in the hemisphere. The
dramatic wage differential, the extensive land border between the United
States and Mexico, and the needs of the U.S. labor market make a certain
amount of migration from South to North inevitable. Trying to stop illegal
immigration without opening more channels for workers to enter legally is
likely to fail because market forces push labor from low-wage to high-wage
countries and from low-productivity use to high-productivity use.52 And
even if there were some American workers willing and able to fill, at higher
wages, the jobs currently performed by illegal immigrants, there are simply
not enough such workers, and for good reason. As our citizens become more
and more educated, the labor force has shifted toward high-skilled, high-
wage jobs."
The model of strong citizenship-like rights for all immigrants coupled
with tightly controlled admissions is thus untenable as a practical matter.
The United States desperately needs an immigration policy that recognizes
the reality of hemispheric interdependence and of the modem form of trans-
national migration. But it is not clear that this need is compatible with
immigration as transition, compelling as it is. The virtual inevitability of
immigration to the United States from Latin America, at least for the fore-
54
seeable future, demands large-scale admissions, which is likely to mean
immigration as transition will remain a compelling ideal honored in the
breach.
CONCLUSION
Our dilemma is as follows. Motomura is quite right that immigration as
transition offers us the best means of ensuring immigrant integration, foster-
ing immigrant loyalty to the United States, and encouraging social
investment by immigrants. But we also need an immigration policy that can
52. GORDON HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLE-
GAL IMMIGRATION 32 (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
ImmigrationCSR26.pdf.
53. See DOWELL MYERS, IMMIGRANTS AND BOOMERS: FORGING A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
FOR THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 37-38 (2007); see also Immigration: Economic Impacts: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 66 (2006) (written testimony of Dan Siciliano,
Executive Director, Program in Law, Economics, and Business, Stanford Law School). The testi-
mony notes:
As the number of less-skilled jobs continues to grow, it will become increasingly difficult for
employers to find native-born workers, especially younger workers, with the education levels
that best correspond to those jobs. In this sense, immigrant workers are a vital complement to a
native-born labor force that is growing older and better educated.
Id.
54. The current political climate extends this generosity only in the form of de facto acquies-
cence in high levels of unauthorized immigration. But it is not insignificant that those who
obstructed the 2007 attempt at comprehensive immigration reform neither proposed reducing the
number of legal admits nor provided a workable alternative for dealing with the current unauthor-
ized problem short of more enforcement, which is likely to have only limited effect.
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handle cross-border traffic-the impacts of development, trade, and hemi-
spheric integration-while mustering public support. One strategy might be
to take Motomura's immigration as transition as aspirational and set about
trying to persuade the public to embrace the idea over the long haul. But the
admissions-status dynamic will be difficult to dislodge and will only be-
come more entrenched in times of economic downturn or moments of
national insecurity. We thus are left with a set of conditions that demands
immigration as transition in order to promote integration and long-term so-
cial peace but that simultaneously renders immigration as transition
unachievable as a political matter.55
Part of the answer to the paradox Motomura's work reveals will involve
self-consciously integrating the immigration-as-transition idea into more of
our laws through hybrid devices or structures. We might adopt a guest
worker program with a path to permanent residency or citizenship. A legali-
zation plan could include a relatively short path to citizenship and a de
minimis number of purely punitive provisions. We could also do a better job
of facilitating the incorporation of the immigrants we already admit for
permanent residence, easing the naturalization process and investing mean-
ingful resources in adult language education and other integration-related
56programs. Our national citizenship constructs thus could continue to bal-
ance immigration as contract and immigration as affiliation humanely and
rationally while including aspects of immigration as transition to the extent
possible. Arguably, all Motomura is calling for is a reinvigoration of the
concept of immigration as transition, and there are ways of incorporating
that insight into our structures of belonging, even if the return to filing dec-
larations of intent to naturalize in order to acquire the rights of citizenship
immediately is not achievable systemwide.
We may also need to rely more heavily on subfederal territorial alterna-
tives to national citizenship---to ensure that belonging is geographically
grounded in at least some way.57 This strategy would include turning to state
and local forms of citizenship to capture the more demanding aspects of the
55. By political, I refer not only to today's fights between Republicans and Democrats but to
the political dynamics of a complex modem society accustomed to robust citizenship prerogatives.
56. See, e.g., MARGIE MCHUGH ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., ADULT ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE INSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETERMINING NEED AND INVESTING WISELY 3
(2007), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NCIIP EnglishInstruction073107.pdf
(noting that English language classes are woefully underfunded and insufficient to meet current
demand); see also IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND
REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1-5 (2006) (arguing that the way immigrants are
received is crucial to their incorporation and that Canada, with its multiculturalism policies, per-
forms better on this score than the United States).
57. Cf Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 409 (2007). Bosniak notes that "territoriality . .. honor[s] the real
attachments people develop in their daily lives." Id. However, territoriality "promises more than it
delivers.... [W]hen read through the lenses of globalization, we see that territoriality is beginning
to fray.., largely because territory itself no longer organizes social and political life in the determi-
native way it once did." Id. For additional discussions of citizenship and territoriality, see RUTH
RUBIO-MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2000).
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Americans-in-waiting idea. This approach would use the tools of decentrali-
zation to provide immigrants with strong forms of belonging in ways
calibrated to different states and localities' willingness to accept and inte-
• • 58
grate immigrants. We might allow states and cities to compete for
immigrants, or the federal government might give states incentives to attract
immigrants and treat them as quasi citizens. This cooperative federal-state-
local process might ultimately produce the sorts of institutional grounding
that social stability requires. Such an approach is not a perfect substitute for
national citizenship because only national citizenship can confer on immi-
grants the right to remain. But it might be a mechanism for negotiating the
different migration dynamics currently working at cross-purposes. What is
more, the benefits attached to these more localized forms of citizenship can
be equally great, if not greater than, what the federal government is prepared
to give, as the tradition of noncitizen voting in local and state elections un-
derscores ."
In the end, it may well be that national citizenship qua national citizen-
ship cannot absorb the contemporary realities of migration. But Motomura
reminds us that we cannot lose sight of our need for a geographically
grounded conception of membership. Such a conception is necessary to
promote the political and social cooperation required among inhabitants of
the same space in a transnational world.
58. I discuss at length how states and localities have shown themselves capable of perform-
ing this function in Rodriguez, supra note 26.
59. For a discussion of this history, see RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING
IMMIGRATION VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 15-40 (2006).
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